The Speech Act of Swearing: Gregory of Nazianzus’s Oath in Poema 2.1.2 in Context by Abrams Rebillard, Suzanne
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
School of Information Studies - Post-doc and 
Student Scholarship School of Information Studies (iSchool) 
2013 
The Speech Act of Swearing: Gregory of Nazianzus’s Oath in 
Poema 2.1.2 in Context 
Suzanne Abrams Rebillard 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ischoolstudents 
 Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Christianity 
Commons, and the Classical Literature and Philology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abrams Rebillard, Suzanne, "The Speech Act of Swearing: Gregory of Nazianzus’s Oath in Poema 2.1.2 in 
Context" (2013). School of Information Studies - Post-doc and Student Scholarship. 3. 
https://surface.syr.edu/ischoolstudents/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Studies (iSchool) at SURFACE. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Information Studies - Post-doc and Student Scholarship by an 
authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Journal of Early Christian Studies 21:2, 177–207 © 2013 The Johns Hopkins University Press
The initial research for this article was conducted thanks to a fellowship from the 
Program in Hellenic Studies at Princeton University.
1. Philippe Lejeune, “The Autobiographical Contract,” in French Literary Theory 
Today, ed. Tzvetan Todorov (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 193.
2. Following PG 37:969–1452: Liber II. Poemata Historica. Sectio I. De seipso 
(cited here as 2.1.x). The title is given to a volume of translations: Carolinne White, 
trans.,  Gregory of Nazianzus: Autobiographical Poems, Cambridge Medieval Clas-
sics 6 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The term is also applied 
The Speech Act of Swearing: 
Gregory of Nazianzus’s Oath  
in Poema 2.1.2 in Context
SUZANNE ABRAMS REBILLARD
Gregory of Nazianzus’s Poemata de seipso as a group are labeled “autobiogra-
phy” erroneously. 2.1.2 provides a strong case study: it is formally structured 
as an oath, to be sworn by a bishop but with no definitive identification of 
speaker. As an oath it is well suited to the application of speech act theory, 
which allows for interpretations with Gregory and/or any orthodox bishop 
as speaker. When further considered in light of other oaths as compositional 
models—professional (e.g. Hippocratic), magisterial, imperial loyalty, biblical—
the poem’s scope expands beyond the “autobiographer” to encompass the 
episcopate and fourth-century culture more broadly. 
In the wake of the dissolution of Lejeune’s coalescence of author, narra-
tor, and protagonist as a generic norm of autobiography, labeling a text as 
such introduces a host of complications for interpretation and approach.1 
Precarious as the relationship is between authors and texts of modern 
autobiography, it is even more so with regard to the early texts so labeled 
anachronistically and claimed retrospectively to mark the beginning of 
the Western tradition of self-composed lives of great men. The Poemata 
de seipso of Gregory of Nazianzus, having been identified as autobiogra-
phy, are paradigmatic of the difficulties one encounters.2 The poems, and 
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to the poems by Francis Gautier in his La retraite et le sacerdoce chez Grégoire de 
Nazianze, Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, Sciences Religieuses 114 (Turn-
hout: Brepols, 2002), Part 2, Chapter 3: “L’autobiographie chez Grégoire,” 214–41; 
and Francesco Trisoglio, “Il Carme II,1,1 di S. Gregorio Nazianzeno: tra rievocazione 
storica e trasfigurazione poetica,” in Motivi e forme della poesia cristiana antica tra 
scrittura e tradizione classica, 36 Incontro di studiosi dell’antichità cristiana, Roma, 3–5 
maggio 2007, Studia ephemeridis “Augustinianum” 108 (Roma: Institutum patristicum 
Augustinianum, 2008), 259–72. Hence circular arguments in attempts to reconstruct 
the personality of the author, such as Ugo Criscuolo, “Sugli ‘epigrammi’ di Gregorio 
di Nazianzo,” in L’epigramma greco: problemi e prospettive, Atti del congresso della 
Consulta Universitaria del Greco, Milano, 21 ottobre 2005, ed. Giuseppe Lozza and 
Stefano Martinelli Tempesta (Milan: Cisalpino, 2007), 19–52.
3. Contra the argument by the poem’s editors that the collection could be traced 
to Gregory himself, who edited it with the help of a “secretary”: Guillaume Bady, 
Jean Bernardi, and André Tuilier, ed. and trans., Saint Grégoire de Nazianze,  Oeuvres 
poétiques, Tome 1, Première partie, Poèmes personnels II, I, 1–11, Collection des 
Université de France, Série grecque 433 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004), lxxiii– lxxviii. 
On Gregory as editor of his own letters, see Ep. 52 (ed. and trans. Paul Gallay, Saint 
Grégoire de Nazianze, Correspondance, 2 vols., 2nd ed. [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
2003], 1:68–69) and Gallay’s introduction to the letters (Correspondance, 1:xx–xxiii); 
and Neil McLynn, “Gregory the Peacemaker: A Study of Oration Six,” Kyoyo-Ronsio 
101 (1996): 183–216.
 especially the extensive De vita sua, have long been regarded as revolution-
ary in their intimacy. They consequently have been read with assumptions 
of transparency and authorial truth in attempts to revivify a fascinating 
figure and to reconstruct the specific historical context in which he wrote. 
Gregory’s corpus, however, more often than not provides its own contexts 
for verification: there is very little corroborating evidence not written 
by Gregory about the events or the “personality” described therein. For 
many of the ninety-nine “Autobiographical Poems” in particular, the only 
evidence of compositional context for an individual poem and historical 
context(s) of the event narrated is internal. Moreover, these widely diverse 
poems are comprised not only of narratives, but prayers, curses, charms, 
invective, and epitaphs as well, and the conception of them as a collection 
about the poet himself derives primarily from an eighteenth-century edito-
rial construct based in great part on their common first-person voice.3 If 
Gregory as autobiographer retreats, whose voice do we hear?
Publication within the last thirty years of the first critical editions of 
these poems and of their translation into modern languages has allowed 
historians greater access to Gregory’s supposedly personal and introspec-
tive but complex writings, and they have discovered what seems to be a 
symphony of evidence about the man and the fourth century. Yet as Brian 
Daley sagely advises in the introduction to his recent volume of transla-
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4. Brian E. Daley, S.J., Gregory of Nazianzus, The Early Church Fathers (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 2; emphasis mine.
5. The most recent contributions to the bibliography appear in Christopher  Beeley, 
ed., Re-reading Gregory of Nazianzus, Essays on History, Theology, and Culture, CUA 
Studies in Early Christianity (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2012), which appeared too late for me to take into account in this article. See 
(selectively): Bradley K. Storin, “In a Silent Way: Asceticism and Literature in the Reha-
bilitation of Gregory of Nazianzus,” JECS 19:2 (2011): 225–57; Jean Paul Lieggi, La 
cetra di Cristo, le motivazioni teologiche della poesia di Gregorio di Nazianzo (Rome: 
Herder Editrice, 2009); Christos Simelidis, Selected Poems of Gregory of Nazian-
zus, I.2.17; II.1.10, 19, 32: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Commentary, 
Hypomnemata, Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben 177 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009); the contributions on Gregory in Motivi e forme, 
281–412; Jostein Børtnes and Tomas Hägg, ed., Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and 
Reflections (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006); Kristoffel Demoen, Pagan 
and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen: A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics, 
Corpus Christianorum, Lingua patrum 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996). Exceptions are: 
Dayna Kalleres, “Demons and Divine Illumination: A Consideration of Eight Prayers 
by Gregory of Nazianzus,” VC 61:2 (2007): 157–88; and Susanna Elm, “Inventing 
the ‘Father of the Church’: Gregory of Nazianzus’ ‘Farewell to the Bishops’ (Or. 42) 
in its Historical Context,” in Vita Religiosa im Mittelalter, Festschrift für Kaspar Elm 
zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Franz J. Felten and Nikolas Jaspert, Berliner historische Stu-
dien 31, Ordensstudien 13 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), 3–20.
tions: “In reading his works, we must thread our way carefully through 
the details of Gregory’s emotional, dramatic, often self-justifying presen-
tation of himself, to try to discover the man, the priest, the theologian, as 
others in his day might have known him.”4 There is a growing body of 
scholarship on the rhetorical, philosophical, and literary contexts, par-
ticularly classical and biblical, that informed Gregory’s poetic habit, but 
there has been little consideration of non-literary and perhaps even more 
mundane influences.5
This paper is a case study of the second of Gregory’s Poemata de seipso 
(2.1.2), an attempt to reveal what many of these so-called autobiographical 
pieces offer beyond a positivist quest for Gregory as subject. There is no 
thorough—or even cursory, so far as I am aware—treatment of this poem 
in the scholarship. The discussion below begins with an identification of 
Poema 2.1.2 as a formal oath concerning proper performance of the epis-
copal office and consideration of the problems related to dating the poem. 
Faced with numerous uncertainties, specifically the ambiguous nature of 
the poem’s opening aorist, the study turns to speech act theory, an obvi-
ous theoretical framework given the poem’s formal structure, to discover 
what the poem can offer in lieu of an attempt to discover specifics about 
the author. This approach allows for a double reading: with Gregory as 
subject and without. This interpretive route is then pursued further in an 
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6. Unless noted, all translations of Gregory’s poetry here are my own. The edi-
tion followed here is Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier, Poèmes personnels, 44–45: Ὤμοσα 
examination of the poem within the context of Gregory’s wider attitude 
to swearing. Finally, possible extra-biographical compositional contexts 
are identified and explored in an investigation of oath types that could 
have been models for 2.1.2, to suggest that the poem might be read as a 
professional oath or oath of office for bishops, a doctrinal loyalty oath, 
or a judicial oath of self-defense, rather than simply as a record of an oath 
sworn by the illusive “Gregory the man.”
I provide here my translation of the entire poem, without a title and 
with alternative verbs in brackets for reasons discussed below.
I swear [swore] on the very Logos, who for me is greatest God, 
source from source, of the immortal Father,
image of the archetype, a nature its begetter’s equal, 
who descended even into human existence from heaven;
I swear [swore] I will [would] not, diabolically minded, cast off the
 Great Mind 5 
with heretic mind, nor the Word with heretic word.
If I should sunder the divinity of the luminous Trinity, 
hearkening to the will of this inimical age; 
if the great seat should ever goad my mind to madness, 
or should I lay on my hand with heretical desire;  10
if I should prefer a mortal guardian to God, 
securing my line to a weak rock;
if I should ever have a haughty spirit in good fortune, 
or confronted with ills, conversely fall feeble; 
if feigning righteousness I should dispense a justice somehow skewed;  15 
if the supercilious should receive my esteem before the holy; 
if seeing the base somehow at peace or crags on the route of the noble 
I should veer from the right path;
if envy should dissolve my spirit; if I should mock 
the stumbling of another, even one unholy, as if holding my own  
step secure;  20
if my mind should collapse with tumid anger, and if unbridled 
my tongue race and my heart turn a wanton eye;
if I should hate someone fruitlessly, and if I should punish  
my enemy stealthily or even openly;
if from my home I should dismiss a beggar empty-handed,  25 
or a spirit still thirsting for a heavenly word;
may Christ attend another more gently, but as for my efforts, 
even up to my white hairs, may the breeze take them.
By these laws I bind [bound] my existence. And should I achieve 
the fulfillment of my desire, Eternal Christ, thanks be to you.6  30
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τὸν Λόγον αὐτόν, ὅ μοι Θεός ἐστι μέγιστος, / ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, Πατρὸς ἀπ’ ἀθανάτου, / 
εἰκὼν ἀρχετύποιο, φύσις γεννήτορος ἴση, / ὃς φθάσε καὶ μερόπων ἐς βίον οὐρανόθεν, / 
ὤμοσα μήτε νόῳ γε νόον μέγαν, ἐχθρὰ νοήσας, / ῥίψειν μήτε λόγῳ τὸν Λόγον ἀλλοτρίῳ. / 
Εἰ Τριάδος θεότητα διατμήξαιμι φαεινῆς, / ἐσπόμεος καιρῶν νεύμασιν ἀντιπάλων· / εἰ 
δ’ ἕδρη μεγάλη ποτ’ ἐμὸν νόον οἰστρήσειεν, / ἠὲ πόθῳ δοίην ἀλλοτρίω παλάμην· / εἰ δὲ 
θεοῦ προπάροιθε βροτὸν θείμην ἐπίκουρον, / πέτρης ἠπεδανῆς πείσματ’ ἀναψάμενος· / εἰ 
δέ ποτ’ ἐσθλὰ φέροντος ἀγήνορα θυμὸν ἔχοιμι, / ἠὲ κακοῖς κύρσας, ἔμπαλιν ἀδρανέα· / εἰ 
δὲ δίκην δικάσαιμι παρακλίνας τι θέμιστος, / εἰ δὲ λάβοι τιμὴν ὀφρὺς ὕπερθ’ ὁσίων· / εἰ δὲ 
κακοὺς ὁρόων τι γαληνιόωντας ὁδοῖο / σταίην δεξιτερῆς, ἢ ἀγαθῶν σκοπέλους· / εἰ φθόνος 
ἐκτήξειεν ἐμὴν φρένα· εἰ γελάσαιμι / πτῶμα καὶ οὐχ ὁσίων, ὡς πόδα πηγὸν ἔχων· / εἰ δὲ 
χόλῳ πλήθοντι πέσοι νόος, εἰ δ’ ἀχάλινος / γλῶσσα θέοι, μάχλον τ’ ὄμμα φέροι κραδίη· / εἰ 
δέ τιν’ ἐχθαίροιμι μάτην, εἰ δ’ ἐχρθὸν ἐμεῖο / τισαίμην δολίως, ἠὲ καὶ ἀμφαδίην· / εἰ κενεὴν 
πέμψαιμι δόμων ἄπο χεῖρα πένητος, / εἰ φρένα διψαλέην οὐρανίοιο λόγου· / ἄλλῳ Χριστὸς 
ἔοι πλέον ἵλαος, αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο / τοὺς ἄχρι καὶ πολιῆς αὖρα φέροι καμάτους. / Τοῖσδε νόμοισιν 
ἔδησα ἐμὸν βίον. Εἰ δὲ πόθοιο / ἐς τέλος ἱκοίμην, ἄφθιτε, σεῖο χάρις.
7. Carmelo Crimi and Ivano Costa, ed. and trans., Gregorio Nazianzeno: Poesie/2, 
Collana di testi patristici 150 (Rome: Città Nuova, 1999), 66.
8. Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier, Poèmes personnels, 44–45. 
9. The edition lists twenty-six mss. containing the poem and relies on nineteen, one 
missing lines 1–19 (Parisinus gr. 993, f. 7–144, 168–230; Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier, 
Poèmes personnels, cxcviii, ccvii). Ὅροι βίου is also the title in Nicetas David’s ninth-
century commentary (ed. Ernst Dronke, S. Gregorii Nazianzeni, Carmina selecta. 
Accedit Nicetae Davidis paraphrases nunc primum e codice Cusano edita [Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1840], 114, note to line 3). Note that Gregory uses the word 
νόμοι in the closing couplet to refer to the “rules” he lays down in the poem, not ὅροι.
10. George Wesley Buchanan (“Some Vow and Oath Formulas in the New Testa-
ment,” HTR 58 [1965]: 321–22) offers the same tripartite definition. The  definition 
FORMAL STRUCTURE AND DATING
In Carmelo Crimi’s 1999 translation, Poema 2.1.2 is titled “Giuramento 
di Gregorio,” from the PG’s Ὅρκοι Γρηγορίου, which itself follows the 
tradition of de Billy and the Maurist editors whose text Migne adopted.7 
Only one of the eighteen manuscripts in which the poem appears with a 
title contains ὅρκοι. Jean Bernardi’s French translation of the poem in the 
first critical edition of the piece is titled “Règles de vie,”8 from Ὅροι βίου, 
the title most common in the manuscripts and in manuscript L, which the 
textual editors, André Tuilier and Guillaume Bady, deem the most reli-
able.9 We have no indication whether and/or how Gregory himself titled 
the poem.
The difference in title begs the question of whether the piece is an actual 
oath or a more general statement. In addition to its opening word, “I swear 
[swore],” structurally the poem is an oath. It adheres to a traditional tripar-
tite formula comprised of an initial swearing naming the object by which 
one swears, a curse, and a closing describing the conditions governing the 
reception of the curses.10
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found in Alan H. Sommerstein and Judith Fletcher, ed., Horkos: The Oath in Greek 
Society (Exeter: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2007), 2, differs, but is also tripartite and all 
three of its elements are in 2.1.2: a declaration, a calling on divinity, a self cursing. For 
a wider definition, see Alan H. Sommerstein, “Cloudy Swearing: When (if ever) is an 
Oath not an Oath?” in Sommerstein and Fletcher, Horkos, 125–37; Robert F. O’Toole, 
“Acts 2.30 and the Davidic Covenant of Pentecost,” JBL 102 (1983): 250–54; and 
Kevin Uhalde, Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine (Philadelphia, PA: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 77–104. On the distinction between an oath and 
a vow: Johannes Schneider, art. ὀμνύω, TWNT 5 (1990), 177–85, esp. 178n16; Jean 
Rudhart, Notions fondamentales de la pensée religieuse et actes constitutifs du culte 
dans la Grèce classique, 2nd ed. (Paris: Picard, 1992), esp. 202–12. Now see Judith 
Fletcher, Performing Oaths in Classical Greek Drama (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) esp. 2–11, which is based in large part on speech act theory.
11. Cf. the use of the same verb with χεῖρα referring to the laying on of hands in 
Or. 43.78 (SC 384:298): ἵνα τοῖς τῆς εὐσεβείας συναπέλθῃ ῥήμασι καὶ χειροτονίαις τῶν 
γνησιωτάτων αὐτοῦ θεραπευτῶν, τὴν χεῖρα δίδωσι καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα, ὥστε. . . . The word for 
hand is different, but note that παλάμη often carries the connotation of a hand used 
in violence or at least misdeed, as is the scenario suggested in my translation; cf. e.g. 
Epigrams 200.4; 207.4, 213.3, 230.2 (ed. and trans. William R. Paton, The Greek 
Anthology, 5 vols., Loeb Classical Library 67–68, 84–86 [New York: G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1919, repr. 1993], 2:486, 488, 492, 498).
12. One might argue for a more general interpretation, translating πόθῳ ἀλλοτρίῳ 
as an indirect object, as do Crimi (Poesie/2, 66) and Bernardi (Bady, Bernardi, and 
Tuilier, Poèmes personnels, 44). However, given the similarity to Or. 43.78, which 
also lacks a indirect object for δίδωσι, and the fact that the conjunction linking line 
1. Lines 1–6: The speaker tells of having sworn/swearing an oath to Christ 
that he will/would not think or speak heretically.
2. Lines 7–28: He presents fourteen conditions for fidelity to the oath, 
followed by the penalty (lines 27–28) should he prove faithless—Christ 
will direct his care to others while the poet’s efforts remain without 
consequence.
3. Lines 29–30: He reiterates that this was his oath with a positive 
statement of condition and reward—if he is successful, he will give 
thanks to Christ.
The poem is clearly about the episcopate, not just general rules for 
Christian life. There is a reference to the “great seat,” ἕδρη μεγάλη, in line 
9, which both translators interpret as the episcopal throne. In line 15, 
the poem makes reference to audientia episcopalis in the dispensing of 
justice. Line 10 is a reference to the laying on of hands in the ordination 
of priests and/or consecration of bishops.11 Πόθῳ ἀλλοτρίῳ is translated 
here as instrumental dative, providing Gregory’s motive; ἀλλοτρίῳ, liter-
ally “alien,” is construed as “heretical” given that the preceding, and first, 
element of the self-cursing is about proper interpretation of the Trinity.12 
The promise is to perform only orthodox ordinations.
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10 with line 9, which concerns the great seat, is ἠὲ, a closer connection than the δὲ 
used in other couplets (though recognizing the two are not metrically interchange-
able), an interpretation about ordination as a primary responsibility of the bishop is 
preferred. Cf. Or. 10.4 (SC 405:324–27) for the purifications of hands in relation to 
the duties of a bishop, followed closely by reference to the ordination of Aaron (noted 
by Marie-Ange Calvet-Sebasti, ed. and trans., Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 6–12, 
SC 405 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1995], 325n5). One of the anonymous readers 
for JECS suggested reading the dative as an indirect object with the interesting con-
clusion that the line refers to making an alliance with a heretic.
13. Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1956), 1938. On the initial verb of swearing in late antique and Byzantine 
papyri, see Zola M. Packman, “Still Further Notes on Papyrus Documents with the 
Imperial Oath,” ZPE 100 (1994): 207–10, arguing based on the variety of formulae 
in Egypt for the difficulty of studying the implications of specific word choices relative 
to cultural norms. For other examples of the aorist in oaths, see, e.g., P. Wisc. 1.11, 
line 26 (though seventh century; discussed with other examples of early Byzantine 
oaths in K. A. Worp, “P. Wisc. I.11: The Oath Formula,” ZPE 45 [1982]: 224–26).
14. Following de Jonge and de Billy via Migne (PG 37:1017; Poesie/2, 66n1).
15. See Gautier’s Retraite et sacerdoce on Gregory’s itinerancy as a bishop. On 
Gregory’s election, see Adolf M. Ritter, Das Konzil von Konstantinopel und sein Sym-
bol, Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie des 2. Ökumenischen Konzils, Forshungen 
zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 15 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), 
44–53. John McGuckin structures the better part of his biography on Gregory’s cleri-
cal positions (Saint Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography [Crestwood, 
NY: Saint Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001], 169–203 on Sasima; 234–43 on his call 
to Constantinople). It has been assumed that Gregory was “officially” installed in 
Constantinople by, e.g., Peter Van Nuffelen (“Episcopal Succession in Constantinople 
[381–450 c.e.]: The Local Dynamics of Power,” JECS 18:3 [2010]: 441–42); but for a 
questioning of Gregory’s status in the capital, see Neil McLynn, “Moments of Truth: 
The poem’s opening word is temporally ambiguous. Verbs of swearing 
often appear in the aorist. Ὤμοσα can be either a present, “I swear,” or a 
simple past, “I swore.”13 If it is read as a past tense, we must distinguish 
between the poem and the oath recorded in it: the compositional context 
of the poem is not the same as the “historical” context of the swearing 
of the oath. Crimi translates the word as a past tense, making the piece 
an historical account, and he notes that others date the poem and oath 
together to Gregory’s elevation to the episcopal see of Sasima in 372, a 
concurrence that suggests the poem records an oath upon consecration.14 
The basis for this dating is the mention of the ἕδρη μεγάλη, but this does 
not necessitate that the oath was taken on Gregory’s elevation to Sasima. 
Though it was the first see he occupied, he was also the sole acting bishop 
of both Constantinople (379–81) and Nazianzus (381–83), as well as 
auxiliary bishop to his father in Nazianzus after his refusal to take up 
residence in Sasima.15 Though there is evidence of priests swearing oaths 
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Gregory of Nazianzus and Theodosius I,” in From the Tetrarchs to the Theodosians: 
Later Roman History and Culture, 284–450 CE, ed. Scott McGill, Christina Sogno, 
and Edward Jay Watts (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 218–31; 
and “A Self-Made Holy Man: The Case of Gregory Nazianzen,” JECS 6:3 (1998): 
475–77 (repr. in McLynn, Christian Politics V).
16. For loyalty oaths to a bishop: on Eudoxius swearing to bind himself to Aetius, 
Philost. HE 7.5, 8.4 (ed. Joseph Bidez, Philostorgios. Kirchengeschichte; mit dem 
Leben des Lucian von Antiochien und den Fragmenten eines arianischen Historio-
graphen, ed. Friedhelm Winkelmann, GCS 21, 3rd rev. ed. [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1981], 83, 106); also Ewa Wipszycka, “Il vescovo e il suo clero. A Proposito di CPR 
V 11,” Journal of Juristic Papyrology 22 (1992): 67–81.
17. See ApostConst 8.3 (ed. and trans. Marcel Metzger, Les constitutions apos-
toliques, Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes, SC 320-329-336, 3 vols. 
[Paris: Éditions du Cerf 1987], 3:142): witnesses vouch for the worthiness of the 
candidate before voting, but the candidate is passive. In the description of the rite of 
episcopal ordination in Paul Bradshaw, Ordination Rites of the Ancient Churches of 
East and West (New York: Pueblo Publishing, 1990), 37–57, the ordinand is passive 
until performing the Eucharist.
18. Bernardi translates νοῦς in this line as “spirit” (Bady, Bernardi, and Tuilier, 
Poèmes personnels, 44n3), but the word is used consistently by Gregory to refer to 
God the Father as “mind” and a divine element of humanity. See, e.g., 1.1.1.29 (P.Arc. 
1.29 in Claudio Moreschini and David Sykes, St Gregory of Nazianzus’  Poemata 
Arcana, Oxford Theological Monographs [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997]); 
1.1.4.68 (P.Arc. 4.68), the “world-creating Mind”; 1.1.5.2 (P.Arc. 5.2) the “great 
and infinite Mind.”
19. Cf. examples in Hans Hauben, “On the Invocation of the ‘Holy and Consub-
stantial Trinity’ in Byzantine Oath and Dating Formulas,” ZPE 139 (2002): 158–60.
of loyalty to their bishops and loyalty to a doctrinal party,16 there is no 
evidence to support the assumption of a widespread fourth-century cus-
tom of new bishops swearing an oath when consecrated or elevated to a 
see.17 Bernardi cautiously notes, “«un haut siège»: l’épiscopat,” without 
mentioning elevation, consecration, ceremonial context, or a particular 
see; he suggests no date.
Some of the Poemata de seipso refer explicitly to events that are docu-
mented in other datable works, though most have only an approximate 
date sometime after Gregory left Constantinople in 381. One of the cri-
teria frequently used to date Gregory’s writings has been his responses to 
various heresies. The issue of correct Christological doctrine is a central 
concern of Poema 2.1.2, not only in the debatable interpretation of “with 
heretical desire,” but also on the more secure grounds of the declaration 
that summarizes the core issue in the piece (lines 5–6): “I swore I would 
not, diabolically minded, cast off the Great Mind18 with heretic mind / nor 
the Word with heretic word.”19 Ἀλλότριος is doubly loaded theologically, 
meaning “alien” in the sense of alienation of the parts of the Trinity as 
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20. Cf. Or. 43.30 (SC 384:192–95).
21. Cf. naming lists in Or. 30.17–21, and 31.29–30 (SC 250:260–75, 332–39). 
Christopher Beeley puts Gregory’s expression of doctrine in such a context within 
the framework of the Eastern creedal tradition (Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity 
and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We See Light, Oxford Studies in Histori-
cal Theology [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 181, 192, 314–16). Listing 
is also examined as a rhetorical device by Carla Castelli, “L’esemplarità retorica di 
Gregorio di Nazianzo: spunti per una riflessione,” in Approches de la troisième sophis-
tique: hommages à Jacques Schamp, ed. Eugenio Amato et al., Collection Latomus 
296 (Brussels: Editions Latomus, 2006), 63–79; and on naming in the metaphorical 
argumentation of the Theological Orations, see Kristoffel Demoen, “Metaphor and 
the Ancient Trinitarian Debate: Analogical Language in the Theological Orations of 
Gregory Nazianzen,” in Faith and Fiction: Interdisciplinary Studies on the Interplay 
between Metaphor and Religion, Papers from the 25th LAUD-Symposium of the Ger-
hard Mercator University of Duisburg on “Metaphor and Religion,” ed. Benjamin 
Biebuyck, René Dirven, and John Ries, Duisburger Arbeiten zur Sprach- und Kul-
turwissenschaft 37 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1998), 137–53. On proper naming 
relative to the Eunomian controversy, see Frederick W. Norris, Lionel Wickham, and 
Frederick Williams, ed. and trans., Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theo-
logical Orations of Gregory Nazianzen, Supplements to VC 13 (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 
53–69, 176–82, and 273–78. Cf. the prayer that opens the consecration ceremony in 
ApostConst 8.5 (Metzger, 3:144–48).
22. He does refer in lines 7–8 to the poem as a reaction to severing the Trinity 
in his own times. Cf. language on severing the Trinity: 2.1.55.14–15 (PG 37:1400); 
1.1.3.47–48 (P.Arc. 3.47–48); Or. 31.33 (SC 250:340–42); cf. e.g. Or. 42.15 (SC 
384:80–82) on the unity of the Trinity.
23. “In focusing on Christ’s divinity Gregory is representing what is arguably the 
soteriological mainstream of the early Church” (Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the 
Trinity, 127; and more generally on the problems of identifying heretics as sparring 
partners, 122–28, 285). The problem is clearly stated by Averil Cameron in “The Vio-
lence of Orthodoxy,” in Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. Eduard Iricinschi 
and Holger M. Zellentin, Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum 119 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 102–14.
well as alien to his conception of orthodox doctrine, hence, “heretic.”20 
The poem is Christocentric, addressed to Christ and, given the appella-
tions in its opening lines, a standard definition of Christ’s nature.21 The 
Christological language throughout, however, is formulaic in Gregory’s 
corpus, appearing in anti-Eunomian works spanning his career as well as 
in his later anti-Apollinarian writings.22 The difficulties of arguing for a 
period of composition on the grounds of anti-heretical positions both in 
Gregory and more generally need not be repeated here.23 
Some of the fourteen elements of the self-cursing echo other statements 
Gregory makes upon leaving the capital, a strong indication that the 
piece was written post-381 or at least was revised into its current form in 
that period. There are various similarities with Oration 42, his farewell 
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24. Bernardi argues that the version of the oration now extant with its harsh critique 
was probably not published during his lifetime (ed. and trans. Jean Bernardi, Grégoire 
de Nazianze. Discours 42–43, SC 384 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992], 15–25). Contra 
Bernardi, see Susanna Elm, “A Programmatic Life: Gregory of Nazianzus’ Orations 42 
and 43 and the Constantinopolitan Elites,” Arethusa 35:3 (2000): 411–27; McLynn, 
“Moments of Truth,” 215–16; and Neil McLynn, “The Voice of Conscience: Gregory 
of Nazianus in Retirement,” in Vescovi e pastori in epoca Teodosiana: in occasione 
del 16 centenario della consecrazione episcopale di S. Agostino, 396–1996: 25 Incon-
tro di studiosi dell’ antichità cristiana, Roma, 8–11 maggio 1996, Part 2: Padri greci 
e latini, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 58 (Rome: Institutum Augustinianum, 
1997), 299–308. The similarities are: 2.1.2.7, Or. 42.15 (SC 384:80–83); 2.1.2.13, 
Or. 42.24 (SC 384:102–7); 2.1.2.19–24, Or. 42.13 (SC 384:76–79); 2.1.2.24, Or. 
42.20 (SC 384:90–95).
25. 2.1.2.17–18, 2.1.11.1146, 1248 (ed. and trans. Christoph Jungck, Gregor von 
Nazianz, De vita sua: Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, Wissenschaftliche 
Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern [Heidelberg: C. Winter, 
1974], 104, 114); 2.1.2.19–24, 2.1.11.1200 (Jungck: 112); 2.1.11.1218–29 (Jungck: 
112–14).
26. 2.1.2.13, 2.1.12.345–48 (ed. and trans. Beno Meier, Gregor von Nazianz, über 
die Bishöfe: Carmen 2,1,12, Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, Studien zur 
Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums: Reihe 2, Forschungen zu Gregor von Nazianz 7 
[Paderborn: Schöningh, 1989], 48–49); 2.1.2.25, 2.1.12.433–38, 460 (Meier: 52–55); 
2.1.2.10, 2.1.12.519–21 (Meier: 58–59); 2.1.2.9, 2.1.12.570 (Meier: 60–61); 2.1.2.25, 
2.1.12.309ff (Meier: 46ff).
27. For legalistic formulae, see Elm, “‘Inventing the ‘Father of the Church.’” The 
canon seems to be of convenient applicability: Gregory himself later uses the same 
argument—his being officially bishop of Sasima—to avoid having to act as bishop 
of Nazianzus: Ep. 182 (Gallay, 2:71–72). Van Nuffelen (“Episcopal Succession,” 
447), regarding a later event, refers to the canon as being considered a “minor legal 
problem,” based on Soc. HE 7.36, 40 (ed. Günther Christian Hansen, Sokrates, 
Kirchengeschichte, GCS n.F. 1, 3rd ed., ed. Manja Širinjan [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1995], 385–86, 389–90).
28. On the orations on priesthood: Susanna Elm, “The Diagnostic Gaze: Gregory 
of Nazianzus’ Theory of Orthodox Priesthood in his Orations 6 De pace and 2 Apo-
logia de fuga sua,” in Orthodoxie, christianisme, histoire / Orthodoxy, Christianity, 
to the bishops gathered in Constantinople.24 There are also close com-
parisons with De vita sua, secure in its post-381 dating.25 Poema 2.1.12, 
another bitter response to his hostile colleagues in Constantinople, offers 
similar standards for episcopal behavior.26 Finally, legal imagery in 2.1.2 
(discussed below in greater detail) corresponds with other writings from 
post-381: for example, Gregory argues in De vita sua that his opponents 
brought charges on the grounds of an obsolete law against the translation 
of  bishops—Canon 15 of Nicea—to remove him.27
The episcopal focus in 2.1.2 places it post-372, though many of the simi-
larities with proper episcopal behavior overlap with earlier discussions of 
the priesthood, for example, Oration 2 from the 360s.28 I would hesitate 
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History, ed. Susanna Elm, Eric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano, Collection de l’École 
française de Rome 270 (Rome: Ecole française, 2000), 83–100; Gautier, Retraite 
et sacerdoce, 113–51 on the priesthood, 302–15 on Or. 2; and Beeley, Gregory of 
Nazianzus on the Trinity, 235–70.
29. Moreschini and Sykes, Poemata Arcana, 66–67.
30. See my “The Autobiographical Prosopopoeia of Gregory of Nazianzus,” SP 
47 (2010): 123–28.
31. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, The William James Lectures 
Delivered at Harvard University in 1955, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina 
Sbisà (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). For an example of the vari-
ety of approaches, see Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, ed., Essays in Speech 
Act Theory, Pragmatics & Beyond, n.s. 77 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 2002); or Savas L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Foundations of Speech Act Theory: 
Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994).
to suggest anything so specific as a period of a few years on theological 
grounds as Sykes does for the Arcana,29 but it is reasonable, based on the 
concerns, vocabulary, and imagery that echo other post-381 works, to 
narrow post-372 to a compositional context (or period of revision—the 
formulae and echoes may be due not to a correspondence in period of 
composition but to a correspondence in period of revision and compila-
tion) after Gregory’s retreat from Constantinople in 381.
USING SPEECH ACT THEORY:  
WHICH CONTExT? WHOSE INTENT?
Although Gregory elsewhere in his poetic corpus sketches scenes for quo-
tations of his own speech (whether “real” or fictional), in Poema 2.1.2 he 
does not.30 The aorist of the opening verb is ambiguous. The poem focuses 
on episcopal behavior, but there is no evidence from the later fourth century 
of widespread swearing of episcopal oaths of consecration or otherwise, 
with the few exceptions of doctrinal loyalty. A path out of this interpre-
tive thicket can be blazed using speech act theory, which points to what 
the poem might accomplish beyond revelations about its author. It allows 
us to see what Poema 2.1.2 might do in various proposed contexts and 
to consider its numerous possible effects, rather than a hazy “man” or 
debatable “truth” about any real oath that he swore.
Austin’s How to Do Things with Words and its internal contradic-
tions have spawned forty years of debate.31 Despite conflicts, however, 
all approaches reflect a concern with contexts of performance as basic 
to the rudiments of the theory laid by Austin, as well as to John Searle’s 
consequent development of the concepts of “network” and “background” 
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32. See John Searle, “How Performatives Work,” in Vanderveken and Kubo, 
Essays in Speech Act Theory, 85–108. Lace Marie Williams-Tinajero, The Reshaped 
Mind: Searle, the Biblical Writers, and Christ’s Blood, Biblical Interpretation Series 
104 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), esp. 34–38, beneath its hagiographic approach to Searle’s 
work, makes the point clearly. 
33. See Austin, How to Do Things, e.g. 9–11.
34. On promises as paradigmatic illocutionary acts, see Antonio Blanco Salgueiro, 
“Promises, Threats and the Foundations of Speech Act Theory,” Pragmatics 20:2 
(2010): 213–28; Daniel Vanderveken, “Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory,” 
in Vanderveken and Kubo, Essays in Speech Act Theory, 25–62; and it is the primary 
example in Searle, “How Performatives Work,” passim. For a literary application, 
see Simone Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta serment,’ Eur. Hippolyte, vers 612,” in Le 
serment, ed. Raymond Verdier, 2 vols. (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1991), 1, “Signes 
et fonctions”: 4–22.
35. This does assume an audience of the poem would hear/read it as a record of 
an actual event, not as an imaginary oath, an assumption we also must make if our 
intent is to use the piece as some kind of historical evidence. By Searle’s arguments, to 
label something as an assertive illocution means that truth is a relevant category for 
analysis, not that it necessarily is a true reflection of the world: “. . . it is part of the 
definition of an assertion that it is a commitment to truth” (John Searle, Conscious-
ness and Language [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 146–47); see 
also John Searle, “Illocutionary acts and the concept of truth,” in Truth and Speech 
Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, 
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy 5 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 30.
36. The aorist then functions as the “present present” (a term coined by Julian 
Boyd in conversation with and quoted by Searle [“How Performatives Work,” 106]).
 (linguistic, intentional, and experiential) that he argues allow a speech act to 
communicate meaning.32 Across many shifting definitions and  taxonomies, 
promising—and consequently swearing oaths—is one of the only speech 
acts that has maintained its status as a performative illocutionary act as 
Austin initially defined it.33 It is the most common example for the illocu-
tionary commissive chosen by speech act theorists, and thus Poema 2.1.2 
with its opening verb of swearing is a tailored fit for the application of 
speech act theory.34
This approach offers a resolution to the problem of the opening word’s 
ambiguity. If the initial aorist in Poema 2.1.2 is read as a past tense, “I 
swore,” the poem is an assertive illocution, and the terms of the oath 
should accurately reflect an actual historical swearing.35 If, however, the 
opening verb is an aorist of swearing, then the poem is commissive and 
binding for any speaker—including Gregory—at any time s/he utters it, 
so long as s/he abides by the proper relative extra-linguistic conventions 
and has the sincere intent to swear.36 Searle argues that each illocutionary 
act is characterized by its direction of fit: the point of the utterance can 
be to reflect the world (assertives)—a word to world fit—or to alter the 
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37. John Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 30.
38. As he does elsewhere: 2.1.90–98 (PG 37:1445–51) and by details in 2.1.11. 
39. Also of temporal import in the poem: βίος (lines 4, 29) is the earthly, and hence 
temporally constrained, contrast for eternal life, ζώη; τέλος also has connotations of 
death, the boundary between temporal and a-temporal life. 
world in order to match the utterance (commissives)—a world to word 
fit. Our question about the ambiguity of the opening word of 2.1.2 thus 
can be rephrased in terms of fit: Do the poem’s words fit the world or is 
the world to fit the words?
The answer is, “Both.” In a chapter devoted to indirect speech acts, or 
how it is possible to say one thing and be understood as meaning another, 
Searle argues that an utterance can have two illocutionary forces simulta-
neously, and he distinguishes between a literal and a primary illocutionary 
point.37 In the case of our poem, however, it is not clear which reading 
of the aorist is primary, the assertive or the commissive. There is double 
meaning, but the meanings are of equal primacy. A speaker of 2.1.2 can 
perform at least two speech acts with the poem: recalling an oath already 
taken and swearing. Moreover, a re-utterance of an oath already sworn is 
in essence a re-swearing; and thus the ambiguity of the aorist can be seen 
to reinforce an earlier oath’s continuing bond.
The temporal interpretive context is destabilized in the enigmas of the 
opening of the text even beyond the assertive/commissive ambiguity. The 
assertive aorist states that the speaker swore not to sever Trinitarian divin-
ity or commit any of the other acts listed in the conditional clauses of lines 
7–26, but the nature of swearing means the terms established in an uniden-
tified past moment are continuous to the time of narration and/or reading. 
The commissive aorist is a promissory note for the future, but this future 
is temporally insecure: are we to understand it to start from the time of 
writing or from any time the poem is read? The poem’s audience has no 
indication of which force is primary and Gregory does not identify him-
self as the speaker by name or with specific details.38 The poem, speaker, 
and audience, as well as the propositional content, are thus transported to 
the timeless realm of Christ, significantly identified at the end of the poem 
as the Eternal One [Ἄφθιτε].39 Searle argues that a speaker and audience 
must have a shared network and background—a mutual understanding 
and knowledge of the contexts in which the utterance has meaning—for 
a speech act to be successfully performed, but in 2.1.2 there is purposeful 
obfuscation by the poet relative to his own identity in place and time that 
results in a broadening of possibilities for identification of the speaker. We 
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40. See his Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 141–59 on background; and Consciousness and 
Language, 196ff. on network.
41. The first two are less relevant here: the first concerns a pragmatic linguistic 
approach, namely the elliptical nature of the formula. In the statement “I swear by 
the Logos,” uttering τὸν Λόγον comprises the act of swearing: “the Logos” is both the 
object on which one swears and the “puissance qui préside au châtiment”  (Lecointre, 
“‘Ma langue prêta serment,’” 12). Lecointre summarizes the syllogistic system of the 
oath formula: “L’affirmation solennelle, sacralisée, de l’auto-malédiction conditio-
nelle, par le jeu du syllogisme, glisse et se retrouve dans la conclusion, qui devient 
à son tour affirmation solennelle de non-culpabilité” (Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta 
serment,’”13). Her second point concerns the incorporation of gestures, which are 
necessary components in the success of a speech act, and the difficulty of formulating 
a cross-cultural theory given the spectrum of gestures.
42. Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta serment,’” 17.
43. Lecointre, “‘Ma langue prêta serment,’” 21.
cannot deny the possibility of identifying the poet and speaker as Gregory 
on evidence external to the text and consequently to assume his identity 
and experience within a shared network and background that provide the 
poem with meaning, but there is nothing in the text per se that commits 
an audience to this exact personal identification for the act to be a success.
That success, or “felicity,” is dependent upon the performance of that 
act in accordance with known conventions and it is this emphasis on con-
ventional context that Searle refines in his theories of network and back-
ground.40 Along these same lines, Simone Lecointre, in the introductory 
article of Le Serment, responds to arguments that an oath is primarily an 
oral rite that accompanies an objective act; in the process, she points to the 
fundamental need to consider conventions or contexts. Speech act theory, 
she argues, has posed more problems to linguists and philosophers than it 
has solved, and she brings to light three major problems encountered in 
applying speech act theory to oaths.41 Her third and final point concerns 
the “extra-linguistic” elements of a speech act, “la distinction austinienne 
entre l’acte proprement dit et ses conditions de réussite.”42 She offers this 
preliminary conclusion:
Sans l’histoire, l’ethnologie, et plus généralement les sciences humaines, 
le linguiste et le philosophe sont condamnés à n’aller, contrairement à ce 
qu’espérait Austin, guère plus loin que les mots. Si le réel référentiel n’est 
pas pris en charge, on se trouve réduit à une psycholinguistique du serment, 
dont les effets empiriques ne seront pas plus définis que ne pourront l’être 
ses fonctions véritables.43
She offers the possibility of thinking of oaths as “une modalité de l’engage-
ment”; they establish nothing, announce nothing in themselves, but pres-
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44. Rudhardt, Notions fondamentales, 208. Cf. Basil of Caesarea, Ep. 188.10 on 
perjury (ed. and trans. Roy Deferrari, Saint Basil, The Letters, 4 vols., Loeb Classi-
cal Library 190, 215, 243, 270 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926–
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46. See Storin, “In a Silent Way,” passim, but esp. 235–41.
47. Gregory writes in 1.2.24.245–47 (PG 37:807) that something written is even 
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48. See Gautier, Retraite et sacerdoce, 169–213, on the relationship between writ-
ten and oral communication, also related to Gregory’s attitude toward literature and 
the meaning of silence; and McLynn on Gregory writing to the capital concerning his 
successor there, Nectarius (“The Voice of Conscience,” 299–308).
ent the risk of sanction to which the swearer exposes himself. As such, 
the point of 2.1.2 would be not necessarily the details of the content, but 
the fact of the swearer’s relationship with the Logos. The words of the 
oath are potential; they are not a speech act when divorced from a context 
of utterance. If we are to make sense of Poema 2.1.2 as a speech act, we 
need to discover contexts with which such an oath must engage to have 
meaning—a world it fits and/or would fit to itself.
The poem abides by the formal elements of an oath with its tripartite 
structure; but it also requires a community of witnesses for felicity as a 
commissive speech act.44 In the opening lines of 2.1.2, the Logos is called 
upon with numerous appellations that assert a particular Christological 
doctrine, but the identification of witnesses provides a better key than 
discussions of doctrine for understanding the poem relative to Gregory. 
Gregory sent some of his work back to Constantinople after 381, and 
critiques of bishops from that period were for the eyes and ears of those 
criticized.45 The intended witnesses for the commissive in 2.1.2 about his 
own episcopal performance may likely have been his episcopal colleagues—
those before whom he attempted to rehabilitate himself and whose behav-
ior he critiques and would shape, just as he does in 2.1.12, for example.46 
Thus for Gregory after 381, 2.1.2’s oath would be infelicitous because 
despite the correct semantic formulae and format, these episcopal wit-
nesses are absent upon its utterance.47 Gregory elsewhere in his post-381 
works makes much of a written text being a replacement for face-to-face 
communication, particularly in regard to his opportunity to preach.48 In 
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49. Intentionality: Searle, Intentionality, esp. 4–13, 180–96; and Consciousness 
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this case, however, writing cannot necessarily replace utterance. The infe-
licity, or even the possibility of infelicity, makes an important point: the 
fact that he had to write the text of the oath down in retreat points to a 
deterioration of the very community that should have provided context 
and met the conventions demanded for its “felicity.”
But might we also see the performance of 2.1.2 as felicitous as an asser-
tive with another community of witnesses? In Searle’s development of the 
concept of intent, a speaker’s intention must function together with con-
vention in determining felicity.49 The speaker must intend to both represent 
and communicate, such that s/he has the intention to make an utterance 
and the utterance is intended to communicate its conditions of satisfaction. 
The speech act, therefore, can only have meaning when the speaker and 
hearer(s) share network and background. If we posit Gregory’s community 
in retreat as the witnesses, people who share the wider network and back-
ground, there is felicity and thus meaning is communicated. Moreover, to 
reiterate the specific terms in the process of narration is a powerful state-
ment of Gregory’s fidelity: why remind anyone of the oath unless he has 
not yet perjured himself; but also, by the binding nature of oaths, in the 
future he must be as faithful. The poem by communicating the intent to 
swear indicates Gregory’s willingness to suffer potential sanction—in this 
case, loss of the guardianship of Christ, not something he would ever put 
at risk. The assumed continuity of his intent secures the felicity of the oath.
Any discussion of the oath’s felicity relative to Gregory is, of course, 
speculation given the lack of definitive context identifying the speaker. And 
if we remove Gregory of Nazianzus, identified as the conscious autobi-
ographer? We can apply Derrida’s concept of “iterability,” elaborated in 
the course of one of the most acrimonious debates in speech act theory.50 
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Speech, A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997), 14.
52. Unless, of course, the “great seat” can also refer to something other than the 
episcopal throne and we reinterpret line 10 regarding the application of hands (thanks 
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Iterability severs the conventional ties of Searle’s intentionality. It would 
allow Poema 2.1.2 the multiplicity of commissive functions that are dis-
cussed in the following section—as professional oath, oath of office, doc-
trinal loyalty oath, or judicial oath of self-defense. Judith Butler extends 
Derrida’s iterability into what she calls “citationality,” to suggest contra 
Searle that the subject of an utterance can change, such that an “‘act’ is 
not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the 
condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment.”51 This does not 
mean that a farmer can swear the oath in 2.1.2 and have it make sense.52 
The text is so constructed that there are three fundamental elements of the 
context necessary for the statement to make sense: the speaker must be a 
bishop, espouse the poem’s stated Christological/Trinitarian doctrine, and 
intend to swear the oath. Precisely because Gregory did not provide his 
own or any other specific details in the scene of swearing or in the indi-
vidual elements of the self-cursing, the poem uttered by any doctrinally 
correct bishop in any time or place with the intent to swear will be binding. 
As Derrida warns in Sec, it is impossible to define simply and limit the 
context for a performative. The numerous contexts available for analy-
sis of Gregory’s Poema 2.1.2 and its oath defy classification. Though the 
basic concern of the piece can be identified as the orthodox bishop and the 
poem can be dated with some certainty to post-381, its value as histori-
cal evidence of oaths of consecration or as specific an event as Gregory’s 
own consecration is questionable. Like many of the poemata de seipso, it 
hovers between history, scriptural exegesis, orthodox teaching, devotion, 
and a literary exercise, depending on the interpreter’s and/or performer’s 
context(s). The piece by the arguments of Derrida and Butler is transfer-
able. It consequently might be interpreted as a statement of what Gregory 
would assert regarding his own behavior as a bishop past, present, and 
future, in effect establishing him as a model bishop, but also/or as a bind-
ing text for other speakers. If it was so understood by his contemporaries, 
the poem makes a strong statement, as is argued below, about a desire 
for professional regulation of the episcopacy from within its own ranks.
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53. None of the literary oaths that I examined from the database of classical liter-
ary oaths compiled by Alan H. Sommerstein, Andrew Bayliss, and Isabelle Torrance 
(http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~brzoaths/database [May 23, 2011]) or elsewhere 
(excluding scripture), bears close enough resemblance to 2.1.2 to suggest allusion.
54. Nos. 114, 117, 248 (Paton, 2:450–51, 502–3). See also nos. 2, 192, 253 (Paton, 
2:400–401, 484–85, 504–5).
55. Richmond Lattimore, Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs (Urbana, IL: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 1962), 106–18. On gravestone curses, see J. H. M. Strubbe, 
“‘Cursed be he that moves my bones,’” in Magika Hiera: Ancient Greek Magic and 
Religion, ed. Christopher Faraone and Dirk Obbink (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 33–59.
56. Differing views on the level of prohibition in the Matthew passage: Rudolf 
Hirzel, Der Eid, ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1902), 109–23; 
Dennis Duling, “‘[Do not swear. . .] by Jerusalem Because it is the City of the Great 
King’ (Matt 5.35),” JBL 110:2 (1991): 291–309; Don Garlington, “Oath-Taking in 
the Community of the New Age (Matthew 5.33–37),” Trinity Journal 16:2 (1995): 
139–70; Bernard Kollmann, “Das Schwurverbot Mt 5.22–37/Jak 5.12 im Spiegel 
antiker Eidkritik,” Biblische Zeitschrift n.F. 40:2 (1996): 179–93; Jo-Ann A. Brant, 
CONTExTS FOR SWEARING: PROFESSIONAL, 
MAGISTERIAL, IMPERIAL LOYALTY, AND JUDICIAL OATHS
Why would a fourth-century bishop advertise swearing an oath? What type 
of oath was it acceptable for a bishop—not only the author—to swear given 
possible prohibitions in the New Testament? To answer these  questions, 
I begin with a discussion of Gregory’s attitude toward oath swearing, 
and then consider the types of oath that may have informed his decision 
to structure the poem this way. The compositional models I propose are 
taken from cultural and biblical contexts; the poem is a hybrid, in which 
professional, magisterial, imperial loyalty, and judicial oaths all provide 
productive interpretive models and/or a context for the author’s concep-
tion of oaths, both in Gregory’s biographical context and as a speech act 
performed by other subjects.53
Gregory’s attitude toward swearing is not consistent. He uses it as a 
literary device in a number of his epigrams collected in the Greek Anthol-
ogy, book 8. For example, as speaker/poet he swears (or claims to have 
sworn): “by the power of eternal God who ruleth on high and by the 
souls of the dead and thy dust”; by Dikê and the dead; and “by Tartarus 
itself.”54 These literary conceits follow in a classical tradition of funereal 
epigrams in which the poet speaking as the dead curses looters of his tomb 
or swears to his own respect for other dead during his lifetime in hopes of 
ensuring the security of his resting place and monument.55
Gregory does not absolutely prohibit swearing, despite James 5.12 or, 
possibly, Matthew 5.23ff,56 and in this practical approach resembles his 
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“Infelicitous Oaths in the Gospel of Matthew,” JSNT 63 (1996): 3–20, using speech 
act theory; Marc Philonenko, “Prêter serment par le trône de Dieu (à propos de 
 Matthieu 5.34),” in Le Trône de Dieu, ed. Marc Philonenko, Wissenschaftliche 
Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 69 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1993), 250 (243–51); 
J. W. Roberts, “Some Notes on Swearing,” Restoration Quarterly 4:1 (1960): 30–34.
57. See Uhalde, Expectations of Justice, 77–104.
58. 1.2.24 (PG 37:790–813).
59. E.g. Athanasius (Expositiones in psalmos [PG 27:280.43]) and Basil of Cae-
sarea (Homilia in psalmos [PG 29:260–62]) both assent to the Psalmist’s acceptance 
of oaths in Psalm 62.12. 
60. Basil (Ep. 188.10 [Deferrari, 3:38–43]) writes that one should not force monks 
into the episcopate once they have sworn not to be ordained in order that they not 
be forced into perjury. Cf. Soc. HE 1.38, 5.21 (GCS n.F. 1:88–90, 295–97); and also 
note 6.6 (GCS n.F. 1:317–22), where it is not a problem for the emperor to swear 
even in church. Sozomen records in HE 4.24; 7.3 and 11 (ed. Joseph Bidez and Gün-
ther Christian Hansen, Sozomenus, Kirchengeschichte, GCS n.F. 4, 2nd ed. [Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1995]: 178–81, 304, 314) that Flavian swore then broke the com-
munal oath not to be ordained until Meletius and Paulinus had both died. At 2.16 
(GCS n.F. 4:58), oaths are sworn by the clergy in Alexandria to elect a bishop by 
vote, an oath broken with the elevation of Athanasius. The multiplicity of swearing 
bishops and priests more than suggests such behavior could be assumed believable 
by a late antique audience.
61. But cf. Garlington, “New Age,” esp. 163–65; and Schneider in TWNT 5: 181–
82, on James 5.12, arguing swearing is inexcusable, only required when truthfulness 
cannot be assumed as the norm. 
62. 1.2.25, “Against Anger” (PG 37:813–51; on perjury, 835.6). See the commen-
tary on 1.2.25.313 by Michael Oberhaus, ed. and trans., Gregor von Nazianz, Gegen 
den Zorn (Carmen 1.2.25), Einleitung und Kommentar, Studien zur Geschichte und 
Kultur des Altertums, 2. Reihe, Forschungen zu Gregor von Nazianz, n.F. 8 (Pader-
born: Schöningh, 1991), 131. 
contemporaries.57 He warns against excessive swearing, dedicating one 
of his Carmina moralia to a philosophical dialogue proving the illogic of 
becoming a serial swearer, πολύορκος.58 Other patristic authors call upon 
biblical examples such as Jepthah and Herod to emphasize similarly the 
problems of rash swearing, but also without absolute prohibitions.59 Poten-
tial bishops, according to Basil, Socrates, and Sozomen, even swear oaths 
not to accept sees under various conditions.60 What is frequently at issue 
is the paramount importance of avoiding perjury and always being able to 
assume the truth.61 Though Gregory makes no explicit statement regard-
ing Old Testament versus New Testament attitudes toward swearing, he 
recognizes that among Christians the truth is not always told—even in 
oaths. He thus advises primarily against becoming a perjurer rather than 
against swearing oaths: refraining completely from swearing is a remedy, 
φάρμακον, against falsity in oaths.62 
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63. Ep. 163.4 (Gallay, 2:53).
64. An interesting argument from our legal perspective in which the written is no 
less binding than the oral, and harder evidence that the agreement was made, as comes 
to be the case in the CJ 2.55.4. For another example, see Neil McLynn’s discussion 
of Ep. 112–14 in his “Curiales into Churchmen: The Case of Gregory Nazianzen,” 
in Le trasformazioni delle élites in età tardoantica, Atti del convegno internazionale, 
Perugia, 15–16 marzo, 2004, ed. Rita Lizzi Testa (Rome: ‘L’Erma’ di Bretschneider, 
2006; repr. in Neil McLynn, Christian Politics and Religious Culture in Late Antiq-
uity, Variorum Collected Series [Farnham: Ashgate, 2009], Ix, 282–83).
65. The advice also puts him in an excellent position, like Augustine according to 
Jill Harries (Law and Empire in Late Antiquity [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999], 181) for avoiding a request to act as arbiter in the case. 
66. Rudhardt, Notions fondamentales, 209, 202–12 on oaths.
67. Cf. 2.1.25.1–2 (PG 37:1285): “I was false before you, you the Truth, Logos, / 
in consecrating this day to you.”
Despite the danger of perjury, Gregory argues in Epistle 163 that swear-
ing does have its place and is apparently necessary at times: sworn words 
create an indissoluble bond over which no earthly court, ecclesiastical or 
otherwise, has jurisdiction: “an oath in my opinion is the assurance of 
the one putting forth the question and the one being prevailed upon.”63 In 
this letter he responds to a bishop Theodore regarding a certain George, 
who was seeking release from his oath before Theodore on the grounds 
of constraint and that his oath was written not oral.64 Gregory advises 
Theodore to inform George that he must accept responsibility for having 
broken his oath—not only by his actions, but also by bringing the issue 
before his bishop for judgment—and is to “shed secret tears” before God 
and his bishop. Gregory does not allow for extenuating circumstances: by 
their mutual acceptance of the terms of an oath, be it spoken or written, 
men permanently unite themselves to one another in sight of the divine, 
hence the irrelevance and impropriety of the arbitration of the bishop.65 
The question of whether George’s initial swearing was or was not appro-
priate is moot; to break an oath once sworn is to dissolve the strongest 
bond uniting men, simultaneously melting the divine glue of society. An 
oath is not only the assurance of truth, but also, because it is sworn by 
God as witness, an affirmation of the power of the divine in human inter-
action; to perjure is to be impious.66
When the speaker presents himself as having sworn in Poema 2.1.2, it 
is the Logos, and one might speculate to what extent also “the Truth,”67 
whom he calls upon to witness his oath: an absolute proof of his sincer-
ity and hence doubly of his piety and righteousness. Beyond 2.1.2 (and 
disregarding the swearing poses in the epigrams), Gregory admits to few 
“oaths” of his own after baptism. He claims to have sworn an oath in 
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68. 2.1.26.4–5 (PG 37:1286.1–2): “Be mindful of yourself; do not forget to behold 
God. / You have sworn an oath; remember your salvation.”
69. 2.1.11.1097–107 (Jungck: 106–8).
70. As per Jungck, De vita sua, 177: “Die eidlichen Beteuerungen in seinen Schriften 
hat Gregor offenbar nicht als Eide empfunden.”
71. See David Leith, “The Hippocratic Oath in Antiquity and on Papyrus,” in 
Zwischen Magie und Wissenschaft: Ärtze und Heilkunst in den Papyri aus Ägypten, 
ed. Harald Froschauer and Cornelia Römer, Beiträge und Katalog einer Ausstellung 
2.1.26.5, though the poem is a prayer with no contextual specifics or indi-
cation that the audience need identify the speaker as Gregory.68 He writes 
in De vita sua that having decided to retire as bishop of Constantinople, 
he feared a riot would ensue should he fail to promise to remain in the 
city: “I swore an oath, but not as such (for I have not been bound by an 
oath—if I, too, may boast a little in God—since I was washed by the grace 
of the Spirit); I rather gave my word, trustworthy because of my character, 
that I would remain until some of the other bishops appeared.”69 Gregory 
is cautious, offering a proactive self-defense against charges of rash swear-
ing by redefining his action as giving his word, which is supported by his 
character, rather than swearing an oath, which is witnessed by God.70 He 
removes himself from the threat of divine retribution for perjury. Yet if 
we hear his voice in poem 2.1.2, reading it as an assertive, he is not only 
claiming to have sworn, but even narrating the terms of a formal oath 
sworn once he was bishop, clearly after he was “washed by the grace of 
the Spirit” in baptism, all while calling upon the Logos as witness. Cer-
tainly 2.1.2 might be a literary exercise like the funereal epigrams, hence 
not an outright contradiction of his statement in De vita sua. Even so, if 
so much is at risk in swearing that he must redefine his “oath” in De vita 
sua, what was at stake in Poema 2.1.2 that would make it worth taking 
the risk of proclaiming an oath? There were many situations in which 
an oath was acceptable and even normal for fourth-century Christians, 
including reinforcing bonds between men within the Church hierarchy as 
did the priest Aurelius Besis to his bishop Ammonotheon in the papyrus 
mentioned above. These situations encompass, broadly defined, profes-
sional, magisterial, imperial loyalty, and judicial oaths, the latter linked 
to biblical models.
Professional Oaths: The Hippocratic Model
The Hippocratic oath is an obvious example and a reasonable possibility as 
a professional model. Though we do not know exactly what form it took 
in the fourth century, it was commonly known and was certainly sworn in 
Alexandria.71 Gregory was aware of it, writing in the funeral oration for 
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der österreichischen Nationalbibliothek (Wien: Phoibos, 2007), 35–42; Owsei Temkin, 
Hippocrates in a World of Pagans and Christians (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991), 181–83, 241–48; and Carlos R. Galvão-Sobrinho, “Hippo-
cratic Ideals, Medical Ethics, and the Practice of Medicine in the Early Middle Ages: 
The Legacy of the Hippocratic Oath,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied 
Sciences 51 (1996): 438–55, 438–42 on late antiquity.
72. The fact that Gregory emphasizes Caesarius’s refusal to swear as an example 
of the latter’s Christian rigor suggests that the stance was somewhat unusual (Or. 
7.10 [SC 405:202–7]). See Temkin, Hippocrates, 182n8.
73. See his Or. 2 (SC 247), and Elm’s analysis of it in “Diagnostic Gaze,” 93–95; 
also, Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity, 242–47.
74. Galvão-Sobrinho, “Hippocratic Ideals,” 442. 
75. Heinrich Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and Holy Way’: Personal and Professional 
Conduct in the Hippocratic Oath,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied 
Sciences 51 (1996): 404–37.
76. Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and Holy Way,’” 420.
his brother Caesarius that the latter refused to swear it.72 Gregory appears 
to have had some knowledge of the medical profession, but if it was more 
extensive than the average educated fourth-century aristocrat, and if so, 
whether it came from his own research or through his brother, is not clear. 
Though he presents himself more often as the patient than the physician, 
he makes use of the common image of Christ as the physician of the soul 
as a model for the priest.73 Carlos Galvão-Sobrinho, in an article on the 
use of the Hippocratic oath in the medieval period, argues, using Jerome’s 
advice to priests as evidence, that the novelty of the Christian use of the 
oath in late antiquity was “its use as ‘non-oath,’ as a literary artifact, a 
source of ancient wisdom to be exploited for various purposes.”74 There 
is little similarity in content between the Hippocratic oath, at least in the 
versions we have, and the oath in 2.1.2, thus Gregory does not appear 
to echo it like Jerome.75 But is he using it as a literary artifact in another 
way—as a formulaic type? In swearing an oath that can be definitively 
associated with the bishop’s role, the poem’s speaker—Gregory or other—
might be likened to a doctor swearing the Hippocratic oath: becoming a 
physician of souls in a very formal sense.
Heinrich von Staden has addressed the question of the relationship 
between professional and private conduct in the Hippocratic oath. Βίος in 
the oath, in von Staden’s interpretation, “is used in the primary classical 
sense of the Greek word . . . that is, to signify ‘mode of life’ or the ‘manner 
of living one’s life,’ that is, the ways in which a person shapes the series of 
voluntary activities and the responses to involuntary experiences, which 
make up his or her history.”76 Gregory also refers to his oath in 2.1.2.29 
as establishing the laws by which he bound his βίος, which can similarly 
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77. Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and Holy Way,’” 434. On the interrelation between 
professional, social, and spiritual spheres, see McLynn, “Curiales into Churchmen,” 
282–88.
78. A reality reflected in the structure of the oath: see Von Staden, “‘In a Pure and 
Holy Way,’” 434: “As elsewhere, structure here too is a bearer of meaning: present 
at the beginning, middle and end of the Oath, the gods not only guarantee the bind-
ing force and hence the efficacy of the oath. . . .”
79. Contra Maximus: 2.1.41 (PG 37:1339–44), Or. 25 (SC 284); see Beeley, Greg-
ory of Nazianzus on the Trinity, 242–54 on Gregory’s treatment of the priesthood as 
a profession and “pastoral ministry as a professional skill based on a discrete body 
of knowledge” (247).
80. See Claudia Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian 
Leadership in an Age of Transition, Transformation of the Classical Heritage 37 (Berke-
ley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 172–207, on the social contexts from 
which bishops came and the professionalism of the episcopate; also Sabine Hübner, 
Der Klerus in der Gesellschaft des spätantiken Kleinasiens, Altertumswissenschaftliches 
Kolloquium 15 (Munich: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), passim for social background 
of clerics. On the problems with professionalization from Gregory’s perspective, see 
refer to both his personal and ecclesiastic behavior given the references 
to general Christian behavior and episcopal responsibilities within the 
fourteen elements of the self-curse. Von Staden concludes that in the Hip-
pocratic oath, “the professional and the personal, the public and the pri-
vate, the religious and the secular are, it seems, comprehensively covered 
by the same sworn commitment to preserve them unremittingly ‘in a pure 
and holy way’ . . . the Oath . . . pledges to submit both all of ‘life’ and all 
of the medical ‘profession’ to the same moral and religious restraints.”77 
This interpretation offers a fruitful model for reading 2.1.2 as a profes-
sional oath for bishops. If it is understood as such, Christ as physician is 
not the only example for bishops in the execution of the duties required 
by his ecclesiastic position; the earthly physician who swears by divine 
powers to proper behavior in all spheres of life as part of his professional 
code of conduct also provides a standard for emulation, not least for his 
relationship with the divine as it is broadcast by the oath.78 Von Staden’s 
interpretation of the Hippocratic oath echoes the simultaneously public 
and private description of a proper bishop that is put forth in Titus and 
1 Timothy, as well as Gregory’s own comments throughout his corpus, 
particularly in 2.1.12 and his criticisms of Maximus the Cynic on the ideal 
nature of a bishop: there is no line between public and private behavior 
for a church leader.79 Despite his laments over the professionalization of 
positions in the Church in works composed after his retreat from Con-
stantinople, 2.1.2 mirrors the physicians’ profession in the episcopate, 
perhaps offering bishops an oath of professional standards equivalent to 
the physicians’.80 
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McLynn, “The Voice of Conscience,” 306–8. For another example of Gregory’s com-
plaints on the current episcopate, see Or. 18.15, 35 (PG 35:1004, 1022). 
81. See Van Nuffelen, “Episcopal Succession,” 449–51, with its critique of Peter 
Norton, Episcopal Elections 250–600, Hierarchy and Popular Will in Late Antiquity, 
Oxford Classical Monograph Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), espe-
cially 18–51; Bradshaw, Ordination Rites, 21–25, for increasingly formalized liturgi-
cal developments; and cf. Georg Schöllgen, Die Anfänge der Professionalisierung des 
Klerus und das kirchliche Amt in der syrischen Didaskalie, JAC Ergänzungsband 26 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1998).
82. Elm, “Inventing the ‘Father of the Church,’” 10–13. Cf. Rapp, Holy Bishops, 
169–71, on shared language of praise for bishops and civic authorities.
83. Most evidence is earlier (see Wolfgang Kunkel and Roland Wittmann, Die 
Magistratur, 2nd ed., Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Abt. 10: Rechtsgeschichte 
des Altertums, Teil 3, Bd. 2: Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen Republik 
[Munich: Beck, 1995], 93–96; 93–94 on entering office [iusiurandum in leges]; 253–54 
on leaving office; 96 on before the quaestor; and 228 on soldiers). We do have mag-
isterial oaths from Justinian’s Novel 8, a reinstitution, but it is not clear where and 
when the practice of magisterial oaths lapsed, allowing for Justinianic reinstitution; 
see Charles Pazdernik, “‘The Trembling of Cain’: Religious Power and Institutional 
Culture in Justinianic Oath-Making,” in The Power of Religion in Late Antiquity, ed. 
Andrew Cain and Noel Lensky (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 143–54, esp. 149ff on 
Justinianic magistrates’ oaths of office following on those of Theodosius II and Valen-
tinian III for provincial governors, and their swearing to have rightfully achieved office. 
84. See Elm, “Inventing the ‘Father of the Church,’” 13–16.
Magisterial and Imperial Loyalty Oaths
Magisterial oaths also offer compositional and interpretive models for 
2.1.2, particularly in the latter’s list of νόμοι (or ὅροι, as in the manuscript 
titles) like a code of ethics while holding episcopal office. Their presence in 
the background could reflect the increasingly formalized, and even legal-
ized, selection processes for bishops noted in recent scholarship.81 Gregory’s 
use of civic documents as compositional frameworks has been established 
by Susanna Elm. She argues that Gregory’s Oration 42, his “Farewell 
to the Bishops” (dated to 381), can be read as a certificate of discharge 
from office, in which Gregory must justify like a departing magistrate his 
behavior as bishop of Constantinople.82 Given the concern in 2.1.2 with 
proper behavior while holding a see—and even perhaps with proper ordi-
nation—one might see behind it such a civic oath of office.83 The bishop’s 
bonds, however, are not limited to a “term of office” even for a bishop 
like Gregory who migrated among sees. Like the physician’s oath, they 
entail a lifelong commitment and are inseparable from his wider βίος. The 
publication of such an oath of office by Gregory about himself suggests 
that even despite charges of anti-canonical movements and accusations 
of misuse of funds,84 he is conscious of his accountability before God for 
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85. Clifford Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire, 
Classics and Contemporary Thought 6 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2000), 359. The loyalty oath used as a liability oath is referred to on P.Mich. 5838 
as the “customary oath of the Romans” (Pieter J. Sijpesteijn, “Mutilated Texts from 
the Michigan Papyrus Collection,” Aegyptus 76 [1996]: 30–31; see also Kate Cooper, 
“Christianity, Private Power, and the Law from Decius to Constantine: The Minimal-
ist View,” JECS 19:3 [2011]: 340n30). For its formulae, see Roger Bagnall and K. A. 
Worp, Regnal Formulas in Byzantine Egypt (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979); 
K. A. Worp, “Byzantine Imperial Titulature in the Greek Documentary Papyri: The 
Oath Formulas,” ZPE 45 (1982): 199–225; Z. M. Packman, “Notes on Papyrus Texts 
with the Roman Imperial Oath,” ZPE 89 (1991): 91–102; Z. M. Packman, “Further 
Notes on Texts with the Imperial Oath,” ZPE 90 (1992): 258; and Packman, “Still 
Further Notes,” 208–10. 
86. For texts: Peter Herrmann, Der römische Kaisereid, Untersuchungen zu seiner 
Herkunft und Entwicklung, Hypomnemata, Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem 
Nachleben 20 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968); for brief analysis: Hubert 
Cancik, “Der Kaiser-Eid, zur Praxis der römischen Herrscherverehrung,” in Die Praxis 
der Herrscherverehrung in Rom und seinen Provinzen, ed. Hubert Cancik and Kon-
rad Hitzl (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 29–45.
87. Packman, “Still Further Notes,” 207. As is evident from most of the texts 
provided by Packman, the verb of swearing in these oaths is generally in the present, 
not the aorist, though see page 208 on P.Cair.Masp.II 156 for an aorist in a sixth-
century fragment.
88. One can also speculate about military oaths of loyalty, but there is nothing spe-
cific in the language to indicate it would be the soldier’s oath rather than or as well 
as the citizen oath that served as model here. On soldiers swearing the loyalty oath 
into late antiquity, see J. E. Lendon, Empire of Honour, The Art of Government in 
the Roman World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 12, 253; also A. D. Lee, War in 
Late Antiquity, A Social History, Ancient World at War (Oxford: Blackwell Publish-
ing, 2007), 177, 184. The summary of the sacramentum provided by Vegetius 2.5 
(ed. Michael Reeve, Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004], 
38–39) could perhaps offer a model in the vow to never desert the service (numquam 
deserturos militam) for the poem’s promise not to stray from the Trinity (2.1.2.5–6).
his behavior “in office.” Read as an assertive, the reiteration upon depar-
ture of the precise oath sworn on entering office is a strong statement of 
fidelity to it. Understood as a commissive, Gregory swears before Christ 
on leaving the “office,” or at least the trappings of it in Constantinople, 
that he has executed his office legally and properly, but as such, the text 
could be transferable to any episcopal “office holder.” 
The oath most frequently found in evidence from the Roman period is 
the imperial loyalty oath, particularly in its function as guarantee for the 
truth of documents submitted to the authorities,85 though there are extant 
inscriptions from across the empire of its other uses.86 We have no fourth-
century Cappadocian version preserved, but Poema 2.1.2 exhibits simi-
larities to some of the few inscribed loyalty oaths extant,87 notably from 
Roman Asia Minor.88 In the opening phrase of 2.1.2, the oath is taken on 
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89. My translation, based on the Greek text in Herrmann, Der römische Kaise-
reid, 123–24.
90. Packman, “Still Further Notes,” 208–9.
91. Though ἔνοχος is the more common formulation (see Packman, “Still Further 
Notes,” 208–9). Similar, though from 24 CE and sworn on the emperor Tiberius, are 
the oaths of sluice guards recorded on P.Mich.inv.645 (APIS 2836), also an example 
of a professional oath: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/i/image/image-idx?id=S-APIS-x 
-2836%5D645R.TIF (May 2, 2011).
92. Packman, “Notes on Papyrus Texts,” 95; see also, for the Trinity or God named 
before the emperor, Hauben, “On the Invocation,” passim. The multiple appella-
tions also recall those of God in the prayer that opens the consecration ceremony on 
 ApostConst 8.5 (Metzger, 3:144–48).
93. Cf. Z. M. Packman, “Regnal Formulas in Document Date and in the Imperial 
Oath,” ZPE 91 (1992): 61–76.
the Logos himself, τὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν, the pronoun echoing the naming of the 
emperor in the invocations of loyalty oaths such as from Neoclaudiopolis 
in Paphlagonia dating to the early imperial period: “I swear by God, Earth, 
the Sun, all the gods and goddesses, and the holy emperor himself (αὐτὸν) 
to be well-minded (εὐνοήσειν) to venerable Caesar and to his children and 
descendants, for all time . . . in word and deed and thought (γνώμῃ).”89 
The phrase in italics bears some resemblance to the alien mind and word 
mentioned in the third couplet of the poem. 
The greatest number of surviving texts of late antique Greek loyalty 
oaths come from Egyptian papyri, documents submitted to officials that 
close with a liability clause stating that the party is bound by having sworn 
loyalty to the emperor: person x submits document Y, “being bound by 
the holy oath.”90 The closing couplet of 2.1.2, where the poet claims, “by 
these laws (νόμοισιν) I have bound my existence,” is typical of any formal 
oath, but might be read more specifically as such a liability clause.91 After 
350 invocations of the emperor in imperial loyalty oaths became more 
elaborate: the emperors are referred to effusively by name and titulature, 
no longer simply by a short form of title—similar to the multiple appella-
tions of Christ in the opening lines of 2.1.2.92 Taking this contemporary 
expansion in combination with viewing the imperial loyalty oath as a 
compositional model for Gregory, the poem might be read as a power-
ful political statement: the emperor as guarantor and object of loyalty is 
replaced by Christ. It is also worth noting the initial description of the 
Logos relative to the speaker (ὅ μοι Θεός ἐστι μέγιστος), which is reminiscent 
of the consistent reference to emperors as “ours” (ἡμῶν) in the imperial 
titulature of loyalty oaths.93 When we consider this possible influence in 
light of the assumption that the poem is a response to Gregory’s departure 
from Constantinople, the poem as a loyalty oath asserts that Gregory’s 
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94. On swearing loyalty to a doctrinal party, see Athanasius, De Synodis 3.37 (PG 
26:757–60), and Sozomen HE 2.27, 7.21 (GCS n.F. 4:88–90, 333–34). Later histo-
rians such as Sozomen reinforce Gregory’s claims of support from the emperor (and 
are followed by, e.g., Norton, Episcopal Elections, 30–31), but these later accounts 
may themselves be based primarily on Gregory’s own accounts; see the criticisms in 
McLynn, “Moment of Truth,” 218–31.
95. CJ 4.1.12. On oaths in court see Erwin Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte und 
römisches Zivilprozessrecht, Grundrisse der Rechtswissenschaft (Hannover: Wissen-
schaftliche Verlagsanstalt, 1949), 125–27.
96. Institutes 4.172; 4.172–87 (ed. Ulrich Manthe, Gaius Institutiones / Die Insti-
tutionen des Gaius, Texte zur Forschung 81 [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 2004]: 412–16); on calumnia, see Uhalde, Expectations of Justice, 16–43.
97. CJ 3.1.14; Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 109; Max Kaser, Das Römische 
Zivilprozessrecht, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Teil 3, Band 4: Rechtsge-
schichte des Altertums (Munich: C. H. Beck’s Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966).
98. On the state of scholarship regarding audientia, see Caroline Humfress,  “Bishops 
and Law Courts in Late Antiquity: How (Not) to Make Sense of the Legal Evidence,” 
JECS 19:3 (2011): 375–400.
99. See Harries, Law and Empire, 176ff.
loyalty in the wake of his experiences in the capital is to Christ and the 
supporters of Gregory’s own Christology—emphatically not to the impe-
rial will.94 Yet also, outside the context of Gregory’s own biography, the 
poem/oath could serve as a corrective for a doctrinally divided episcopacy 
of his or any period.
Judicial Oaths 
In the litigious climate of the later Roman Empire, we can also turn to 
judicial oaths as models, though our evidence here is earlier and later, as 
with oaths of office, not contemporary. Swearing had a variety of functions 
within the state’s court system. For example, witnesses and parties swore 
to the truth of their statements.95 Gaius’s Institutes states that the praetor 
could demand parties swear an oath “non calumniae causa infitias ire.”96 In 
the Codex Iustinianus, judges are to swear an oath as to their impartiality, 
though rather like an oath of office than singularly before each case.97 Pro-
ceedings themselves were frequently the result of the breaking of a prom-
issory oath. When one moves outside the court system into the ancillary 
system of arbitration, bishops, including Gregory, played the dominant 
role and we can assume familiarity on their part with legal oaths.98 The 
arbitration process began typically with the drafting of a compromissum, 
a document identifying the parties involved and the details of the issue to 
be resolved, as well as the proposed settlement. The parties’ agreement 
to adhere to the decision of the arbiter as specified in the compromissum 
was guaranteed either by the inclusion of a penalty or by oath.99 There is 
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100. Harries, Law and Empire, 181.
101. Job 31.5, 7; 2.1.2.17–18.
102. Job 31.13; 2.1.2.15.
103. Job 31.16–21; 2.1.2.25.
104. Job 31.29–30; 2.1.2.23–24.
105. The comparison appears in 2.1.19.31 (Simelidis, Selected Poems, 110), a 
poem written in response to his departure from Constantinople; see Simelidis, Selected 
Poems, 190: “Job is mentioned thirty times in Gregory’s writings (seven in the poems), 
usually as a model of wisdom and patience.”
106. Job 31.40–32.1. Cf. the Athenian practice of stopping litigation by swear-
ing: Michael Gagarin, “Litigants’ Oaths in Greek Law,” in Sommerstein and Fletcher, 
Horkos, 39–47.
evidence of oaths taking the place of an audientia episcopalis: Jill Harries 
points to Augustine’s redirecting two priests to swear oaths at the shrine 
of Felix at Nola, a truth test for resolution of their dispute, as an example 
of a matter too delicate for the bishop to handle himself.100 
These legal contexts provide a frame in which we might interpret the 
choice of form for Poema 2.1.2. Seen from a legal perspective, 2.1.2, on 
the one hand, as a record of a sworn oath, can be looked at as an assertive 
oath, a proof, like those of court case participants, sworn on the Logos 
that the speaker has in fact adhered to the terms of the oath reported in 
the poem. It is thus formal and legally binding evidence of the speaker’s 
righteousness and orthodoxy. On the other hand, taking the opening verb 
as an aorist of swearing, the poem might as be regarded as a compromis-
sum that assures the speaker will abide by the standards of behavior set out 
in the poem and by the poem’s Christology. This leaves the final judgment 
to Christ, making the poem a testament to Christ’s, or the Trinity’s, ulti-
mate authority, the emphasis granted to oaths as speech acts by Lecointre.
Biblical Models
Judicial echoes in 2.1.2 resonate when the poem is read alongside Job 31, 
an oath sworn by Job before his critics in defense of his own integrity. 
There are various echoes in Gregory’s poem from the Old Testament pas-
sage, for example: walking the proper path,101 judging fairly,102 helping the 
needy,103 and proper relations with enemies.104 Gregory frequently likens 
himself to Job, even calling himself elsewhere “another Job” but for differ-
ent reasons.105 Like the Old Testament figure, Gregory endures seemingly 
undeserved suffering; his oath is the justification of his righteousness that 
will silence the arguments of his opponents, as Job’s did Eliphaz, Bildad, 
and Zophar: “Job ceased from his words. And his three companions fell 
silent in answering Job; for Job was righteous (δίκαιος) to them.”106 The 
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107. 2.1.2.15.
108. 2.1.2.27–28. Crimi (Poesie/2, 67n3) suggests Gregory’s image is taken from 
Euripides Troades, 454, but the latter has no mention of hair or color.
poet/speaker uses similar vocabulary in reference to himself: “if feigning 
righteousness I should dispense a justice somehow skewed . . .” (Εἰ δὲ δίκην 
δικάσαιμι παρακλίνας τι θέμιστος . . .).107 The language draws the audience 
into a legal context and the similarities with the scene in Job 31 suggest 
the speaker’s voice in the poem is that of a defendant, uttered in opposi-
tion to unidentified accusers. 
Further Scriptural contexts are provided by the two New Testament 
passages warning against oaths referred to above, James 4.10–12 and 
Matthew 5.36. The former suggests Christians avoid swearing oaths by 
becoming Job-like:
As an example of suffering and patience, brethren, take the prophets who 
spoke in the name of the Lord. Behold, we call those happy who were 
steadfast. You have heard of the steadfastness of Job, and you have seen 
the purpose of the Lord, how the Lord is compassionate and merciful. But 
above all, my brethren, do not swear, either by heaven or by earth or with 
any other oath, but let your yes be yes and your no be no, that you may 
not fall under condemnation. 
Gregory directly counters this advice with his poem, an attitude witnessed 
by the ambivalence toward swearing discussed at the opening of this sec-
tion: he becomes like Job precisely by swearing. In addition, 2.1.2’s con-
cluding promise (“may Christ attend another more gently, but as for my 
efforts, / even up to my white hairs, may the breeze take them”) might 
bring to mind Matthew 5.36, if the act of swearing itself has not done so 
already: “And do not swear by your head, for you cannot make one hair 
white or black.”108 The words for white are different—λευκός in Matthew, 
πολιός in 2.1.2—though it is not unusual for Gregory to echo Scripture 
using classical poetic vocabulary; the poem is clearly not using the image 
in the same way; and the image of his white hairs as reference to his age 
is not uncommon in Gregory; but in the context of swearing the white 
hair does suggest to me a link, albeit tangential, between the poem and 
the prohibition in Matthew. Reminders of New Testament prohibitions 
increase the audience’s perception of the speaker’s voluntary peril in the 
act of swearing. The greater the risk, the stronger is the audience’s impres-
sion of the speaker’s truthfulness and righteousness.
Despite all advice against swearing oaths, Christ is asked in Poema 2.1.2 
to bear witness to three virtues of the speaker/bishop: his appropriate 
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professional conduct within and beyond circumscribed episcopal respon-
sibilities; his loyalty to a particular party of Christological doctrine; and 
his righteousness in the face of accusations. The oath format is heavily 
weighted with secular associations that anchor the frame for understand-
ing the bishop’s responsibilities and vulnerabilities in a decidedly mortal 
sphere.109 The overlap of the models colors the portrait of the episcopate 
as a profession. An oath sworn by a divine power, however, binds men to 
the Trinity, and the professional, civic, and judicial oaths that are possible 
compositional models for Poema 2.1.2 are all intended to beckon divinity 
to oversee inter-human interaction. The scriptural resonances, moreover, 
are indicative of the difficulties for a bishop in balancing divine directives 
and human necessity. While the poem as an oath asserts its speaker’s bond 
with the divine, the contexts provided by these models indicate that the 
form, even if a last resort, is obliged by human weakness—and not only 
Gregory’s. Yet as the author of the poem, it is his conception of the epis-
copate that serves as exemplar.
CONCLUSION
On its own Poema 2.1.2 cannot stand as an autobiography in the modern 
sense. It is quite specifically—and perhaps even intentionally—devoid of 
explicit details of context that we can identify with the historical figure of 
Gregory of Nazianzus. Whatever voice of Gregory we might hear in it is 
only ascribable to him in light of our readings in the wider extant corpus. 
As such we can read the piece as either a commissive or assertive illocution, 
a poem, probably written after 381, that presents Gregory of Nazianzus 
swearing or claiming to have sworn at some time a binding oath to have 
behaved and continue to behave properly as bishop. It can thus be read 
as: a professional oath that binds his entire existence even after leaving the 
capital; a loyalty oath and statement of his doctrinal fidelity; an oath of 
legal fulfillment of his terms of office; and an oath of self defense in light 
of charges he transgressed canon law. The poem can be seen as Gregory’s 
statement of his own exemplary status as bishop, and/or of the dissolu-
tion of the doctrinally coherent body of bishops that should have born 
witness to his swearing.
Yet Gregory’s tendency to write about his own life and times is not 
enough to demand we read the poem solely as a conscious record of any 
109. Though given Temkin’s arguments in Hippocrates, the Hippocratic oath had 
been adapted to the specifically Christian world.
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oath of his own or even as referring to his own specific experiences of the 
episcopate, nor does it demand that we perceive his intention in compo-
sition to be the creation of a historical record about those experiences. If 
the poem is examined in isolation from the rest of his corpus and without 
the assumptions that flow in the wake of the poem’s inclusion among the 
Poemata de seipso, we can read it as a commissive illocution, and on the 
grounds of Derrida’s iterability, the original author’s intent can then be 
divorced from the text, allowing each bishop who utters its words in a 
new context, though still in accordance with its doctrine, to perform the 
act of swearing. The oath as act performed, as per Butler, shapes the epis-
copate in the time and place of each performance.
Poema 2.1.2’s uncertainties are what give it life in all its possible con-
texts. It is representative of the problems that arise in approaching some 
of the lesser known, less-narrative pieces in the collection of Gregory’s 
Poemata de seipso as autobiographies in whatever modern sense we con-
ceive of the genre. These poems do reinforce what we know about “the 
man” when read in the context of the other poems, the letters, and the 
orations. Yet some, such as 2.1.24, 25, 26, 48 and 49,110 are like 2.1.2 
de-contextualized. It is when they are so cleaved from their author that 
we perceive an expansion of their potential as evidence of fourth-century 
cultural contexts as well as for the applicability of our own approaches.
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